Anti-corruption “implementation is still slow, effectiveness is not high” is the comment of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Conclusion No. 12-KL/TW of the Politburo dated April 6, 2022, on continuing to strengthen the party’s leadership for anti-corruption affairs.
In the face of increasingly serious, “complicated and sophisticated” national corruption, anti-corruption work is increasingly difficult to challenge, the goal of “The Party and State is clean and strong” in the 13th National Congress’s Documents should be empty, as “slogan” instead of fact, the Party has issued the above Conclusion. During many congresses, the Party emphasized that “Corruption and wastefulness… causing bad consequences in many aspects, reducing people’s trust, are one of the great dangers threatening the survival of the Party and regime.” The article sees the “work” of anti-corruption as an overarching policy or a system of policies, so there is a lack of breakthroughs to transform the situation to promote institutional reform.
First, the corruption situation is increasingly serious, “complex and sophisticated.” Some of the ongoing major cases are listed below as examples. The case of “Viet A,” an enterprise with no capacity to produce COVID-19 test kits, was aided by the state management system and medical expertise, including the Military Medical Academy, accepting bribes in the form of “heavy commissions,” which analysts say has a systemic scale and a “state corrupt” nature. According to a spokesman of the Ministry of Public Security, in the case of the “Consular Department” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the suspects have sophisticated tricks, the bribery ring is concealed, and the relationship is complicated. Major cases are still under extensive investigation and trial, dozens of provincial officials and military officers have been detained, higher-ranking officials have been named by the Central Inspection Commission for disciplinary action, and the list could go on and on. Moreover, “Viet A” was awarded the “Labor medal” by the President in 2018. Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs To Anh Dung, who was arrested on April 12 in connection with the “Consular Department case,” was nominated as Ambassador to Japan just in January this year… Such a situation prompted the Prime Minister who chairs the Central Committee for Emulation and Commendation to exclaim: “Avoid reward and discipline!” when chairing the 2nd session of the committee for the 2021-2026 term.
Second, Conclusion 12 above is just a continuation of the anti-corruption policy that has existed for many years, mainly reflecting the slow innovation of anti-corruption thinking. Right from the 6th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in 1996, the Communist Party determined that it was necessary to strengthen this “work.” In 2011 the Party issued a thematic resolution on “Strengthening the Party’s leadership in the fight against corruption and wastefulness,” the Resolution of the 3rd Party Central Committee, term 10. In 2016, the Party issued Conclusion No. 10- KL/TW of the 12th Politburo on continuing to implement Resolution 3 above and, now, Conclusion No. 12.
The main contents of anti-corruption work still include Propaganda and education; Preventive Institutions; Enforcement measures; Budget management and sensitive areas such as land…; Monitoring mechanism of mass organizations in the political system; Organizational apparatus and material conditions for execution. In this Conclusion 12, the Party is still looking for “mechanisms to control power in areas… prone to corruption” while the Party continues to practice the internal fighting style. In addition, the “supervision“, “audit, inspection, investigation, trial…” without independent organizations and agencies, the enforcement efficiency cannot be high, moreover, it also gives rise to speculations about internal purges, factions… Building a “no-corruption culture” and “anti-corruption outside the public sector” is propagated as a “new point“, but public opinion is “concerned” about the content. , even doubting whether private corporations related to the Party have “lost their passion“?
Third, anti-corruption has been identified as just a “work” of the Party and not considered an overarching policy, so the interactions between the political system and the market have not been thoroughly understood in building solutions. This is a kind of public policy that covers many other laws and policies such as the Law on Land, the Law on Public Investment, the Law on Anti-corruption, the Law on Thrift Practices, Anti-waste, the Law on Inspection, the Law on Democratic Practices, etc.
To mention, one of the important but “sensitive” and “corruption-prone” areas is land. Land is a great resource for accumulating economic development through market dynamics, but it is also a “resource curse” for economic transformation reform. Tens of thousands of Party organizations and officials were disciplined and imprisoned, but one of the main causes of “intentional neglect” was the issue of ownership. The core contradiction between private ownership – the principled basis of the market and the ownership of the whole people – the foundation of the regime has not been satisfactorily resolved, so the institutionalization of land and resources has come to a standstill when space for economic reform is running out.
Business incentives have increased the demand for land use rights to wrong ownership. This shift in tandem with direct elections and equality before the law promotes democratic liberties, but is blocked by universal ownership that reflects the prerogatives of the elite but is manipulated by the elites tyranny is a legal barrier. Therefore, efforts to amend the Land Law fell into a deadlock. Recently, on April 16, the Government for the 4th time asked to submit to the National Assembly the project to amend the 2013 Land Law to “wait for the central government’s opinion“. The Central Steering Committee, with the core being the Central Economic Commission, is “struggling” to summarize Resolution No. 19-NQ/TW, term XI of 2012 “on continuing to renew policies and laws on land… ” for submission to the next Plenary Session, but the predicted results of this Law will continue to be patchy and, therefore, it will be difficult to prevent negative phenomena such as “forests are destroyed everywhere but reports on forest conservation and protection is very beautiful” (Lao newspaper, April 16, 2022).
Fourth, the “we beat us” approach to anti-corruption has not created enough pressure for political reform. For example, the control of officials’ assets is still a “bad debt” of the Party to the people. The people have a great role to play in supporting anti-corruption, but they are ‘outsiders’ in the prevention system. Therefore, a number of projects are being drafted by the Organizing Committee and the Central Committee for Internal Affairs, such as a mechanism to encourage people to denounce corrupt officials or the establishment of a Provincial Steering Committee for Anti-corruption and Anti-Corruption, etc. can be formal because of low feasibility, can even increase the number of Party staff. The goal of the anti-corruption policy must also be for the people, but all actions of the government are directed to protect the regime only.
Does a key question arise about how to abolish the privileged system? In the period of the 1990s, progress was made by monetizing the distribution regimes of housing, items, standards for public transport, etc. However, maintaining the unified state payroll for too long, the life-long recruitment and employment in the public sector cause the labor market to be fragmented, thus distorting the market as a whole.
In addition, the market economy has separated the leadership and executive functions, the Party and the Government, full-time political cadres and technocrats in the direction that the part that is ‘closer to the money has greater real power… and, there are easier corruption ‘conditions’. This is evidenced in the decade of “macroeconomic and institutional instability”. But putting the problem of fighting corruption by centralizing Party power higher is, in the long run, a step backward for reform. As is known, “special cases” have broken the Party’s regulations on age limits and working terms in the two recent 12th and 13th congresses. These norms were originally determined by the Party to prevent corruption of power. To what extent do these “special cases” come into play and set a precedent for the next Party congresses? Moreover, the issue of power transfer is a big challenge.
Finally, the lack of a “breakthrough” policy in anti-corruption makes its feasibility low. The following fairly typical example can help remove the “stable” mentality in the leadership perception. Resolution No. 128/NQ-CP dated October 11, 2021, of the Government on “safely adapting, flexibly and effectively controlling the COVID-19 epidemic” can be considered a valuable lesson on “breakthrough“. It eliminates the “Zero – Covid” approach that has been hailed as an achievement, moreover mobilizes the people’s strength and potential to “save themselves“, meeting the demands of reality, society still stabilizes and contributes to economic recovery. Although not being ‘praised for merit’, the Party and Government have ‘ hands-free’ resources for what needs to be done.
Instead of concluding, the application of the Singapore model, as a suggestion, on using public human resources and leading human resources will be a breakthrough policy that experts have long proposed and is constructive to preventing corruption has “ripe” when the market has penetrated deeply into the Vietnamese economy as it is today.
Thoibao.de (Translated)
